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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine a bold and ambitious scheme known as the
North East transformation system (NETS). The principal aim of the NETS is the achievement of a
step-change in the quality of health services delivered to people living in the North East region of
England. The paper charts the origins of the NETS and its early journey before describing what
happened to it when the UK coalition government published its proposals for unexpected major
structural change in the NHS. This had a profound impact on the leadership and direction of the NETS
and resulted in it taking a different direction from that intended.
Design/methodology/approach – The research design took the form of a mixed methods,
longitudinal 3.5-year study aimed at exploring transformational change in terms of content, context,
process and outcomes. The sample of study sites comprised 14 NHS trusts in the North East region
chosen to provide geographical coverage of the area and to reflect the scale, scope and variety of the
bodies that formed part of the NETS programme. The qualitative component of the research, which
the paper draws upon, included 68 semi-structured interviews, observational studies and focus groups.
Data analysis made use of both deductive and inductive frameworks. The deductive framework
adopted was Pettigrew et al.’s “receptive contexts for change” and four of the eight factors stood out as
especially important and form the basis of the paper.
Findings – The fate of the NETS was shaped and influenced by the eight factors comprising
the Pettigrew et al. receptive contexts for change framework but four factors in particular stood out as
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being especially significant: environmental pressure, quality and coherence of policy, key people
leading change, supportive organisational culture. Perhaps the most significant lesson from the NETS
is that achieving whole systems change is particularly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of politics especially
where that system, like the UK NHS, is itself subject to those very same pressures. Yet, despite having an
enormous influence on health policy, the political context is frequently avoided in research or not
regarded as instrumental in determining the outcomes in respect of transformational change.
Research limitations/implications – The chief limitation is the credibility and authenticity of the
interviews captured at particular points in time. These formed the datebase for subsequent analysis.
The authors sought to guard against possible bias by supplementing interviews with observational
studies and focus groups as well as running two dissemination events at which emerging findings
from the study were subjected to independent external scrutiny and comment. These events provided a
form of validation for the key study findings.
Practical implications – The research findings demonstrate the importance of context for the likely
outcome and success of complex transformational change initiatives. These require time to become
embedded and demonstrate results especially when focused on changing culture and behaviour.
But, in practice, allowing sufficient time during which the organisation may remain sufficiently stable
to allow the change intervention to run its course and become embedded and sustainable is highly
problematic. The consequence is that bold and ambitious efforts like the NETS are not given the space
and stability to prove themselves. Too often, politics and external environmental pressures intrude in
ways that may prove dysfunctional and negative.
Social implications – Unless a different approach to transformational change and its leadership and
management is adopted, then changing the NHS to enable it to appear more responsive to changing
health care needs and expectations will remain a cause for concern. Ultimately the public will be
the losers if the NHS remains insensitive to changing needs and expectations. The patient experience
was at the centre of the NETS programme.
Originality/value – The study is original insofar as no other has sought to evaluate the NETS
independently and over a reasonable time period. The research design, based on a mixed-methods
approach, is unusual in evaluations of this nature. The study’s conclusions are not so original but their
value lies in largely confirming and reinforcing the findings from other studies. It perhaps goes further
in stressing the impact of politics on health policy and the negative consequences of constant
organisational change on attempts to achieve deep change in the way the NHS is organised and led.
Keywords Change management, Leadership, Politics, Quality improvement, Public sector reform,
Health services
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Securing transformational change in health systems is viewed as a top priority if they
are going to be sustainable financially and able to provide care of high quality that is
free at the point of use. Health systems are faced with mounting pressures arising from
epidemiological and demographic changes, especially in respect of an aging population
requiring integrated health and social care and lifestyle-related illnesses affecting all
age groups, as well as from new developments in technology, treatments and other
interventions. Given these pressures, it is argued that health systems, even those which
are functioning effectively when judged according to existing standards, need to
be able to undertake large-scale transformational change if they are to survive (Lukas
et al., 2007). This means being ever vigilant about removing waste and improving
quality and patient safety (McIntosh and Cookson, 2012).
This paper examines a bold and ambitious scheme known as the North East
transformation system (NETS) which has as its principal aim the achievement of a
step-change in the quality of health services delivered to, and experienced by, a
population of 2.6 million people living in the North East region of England. The NETS
was conceived as an experiment in the adoption of large-system transformational
change (Best et al., 2012). While the NHS in the North East performs well, the health of
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the population within the region ranks among the poorest in the country. The NETS
sought to address this paradox by instigating a programme of change aimed at
transforming the way services were provided with a view to improving their efficiency
and effectiveness. The chosen method was derived from the Virginia Mason Production
System, based on the Toyota Production System (TPS), as applied to the Virginia
Mason Medical Center (VMMC) in Seattle which was one of the first hospitals to apply
Lean to a health care facility.
The research design took the form of a longitudinal, 3.5-year study. The sample of
study sites comprised 14 NHS trusts in the North East region. These were chosen
to provide geographical coverage of the area and to reflect the scale, scope and variety
of the NHS bodies that formed part of the NETS programme. A mixed-methods
approach was adopted that explored transformational change in terms of content,
context, process and outcomes.
The qualitative component of the research, upon which this paper draws, included
68 semi-structured interviews, observational studies and focus groups. Data analysis
made use of both deductive and inductive frameworks. The principal deductive
framework adopted was Pettigrew et al.’s (1992) “receptive contexts for change”.
It comprised eight factors (see Figure 1) and although all of them had a bearing on the
issues considered in this paper, the four shaded ones were especially significant. In order
of priority they are: environmental pressure, quality and coherence of policy, key people
leading change, and the existence of a supportive organisational culture. Together these
four factors frame the discussion which follows later in the paper and which points to the
seminal influence of context and politics on what transpired. Although the evidence base
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concerning what needs to happen for transformational change to succeed is certainly
“good enough”, the major impediment to sustaining transformational change efforts is the
seeming absence of political will to allow these initiatives sufficient time to succeed.
But before considering such matters, we first need to describe the NETS programme
in more detail and to consider the nature of the impact upon it of the “big bang” NHS
changes triggered by the UK coalition government following its election in May 2010.
NETS: origins and early years
Like many innovations, the NETS was borne out of a combination of multiple factors and
influences, some planned and others occurring more by happenstance. Central to the
project were two key factors: a determination to improve the quality of care and move
services from being mediocre to good to being second to none; and the existence of
a strong regional identity which would potentially allow an ambitious change programme
to occur with sufficient resources and on a scale that might enhance the chances of
success. As noted above, a paradox with the NHS in the North East is that although
services are generally considered among the best in the country, exceeding targets and
winning awards, the region has some of the highest and deep-seated health inequalities in
the UK. Ensuring that services tackle such failings lies at the core of the NETS.
The NETS is the only example of its kind anywhere in the UK. Other NHS regions
across England have for many years encouraged and supported not dissimilar change
initiatives but these have been confined to particular hospitals or health care facilities.
What is unique and bold about the NETS is its region-wide focus and attempt to
transform people’s experiences of a whole health system rather than its individual
parts acting in isolation from each other. Given the current policy focus on integrated
care, it could be argued that the NETS anticipated such a development through seeking
improved collaboration in respect of care pathways and issues requiring joined-up
working between health services and local government.
The implementation of the NETS began inmid-2007 andwas led by a project team based
at NHS North East. The teamwas established to promote the NETS and provide a link with
the US consultants engaged in delivering elements of the initiative, notably Amicus and the
VMMC in Seattle. The team also hosted meetings and acted as a repository for information
about Lean. The enthusiasm and commitment demonstrated by the NETS champions,
evident both in the team based in the health authority and in the local pathfinder/early
adopter sites, were vital elements in establishing and making real the so-called three-legged
stool – vision, compact and method – in NHS organisations across the region.
Vision
The vision as articulated by NHS North East was to be a leader in excellence in health
improvement and health care services. To achieve this, the health authority adopted a zero
tolerance approach, also referred to as the seven no’s: no barriers to health and well-being;
no avoidable deaths, injury or illness; no avoidable suffering or pain; no helplessness; no
unnecessary waiting or delays; no waste; and no inequality. The vision set out the
fundamental objectives and direction of the NHS in the region (NHS North East, 2008).
It was shared with other public bodies, embedded in local strategy documents, promoted
by the NETS champions, and cascaded down to all levels of the workforce.
Compact
As noted, a long-standing tension within the NHS has been the often difficult
relationship between doctors and managers where tribalism has been the hallmark
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rather than a more collaborative approach (Degeling et al., 1998, 2001; Hunter, 2002;
Gawande, 2011). To address this issue, and central to thinking about the NETS and its
likelihood of success, the development of a “compact” between clinicians and managers
was regarded as a priority. Its purpose was to shape and make real the psychological
contract between clinicians and the institutions in which they worked to facilitate
transformational change (Edwards et al., 2002). To this end, the compact included
a clear statement of responsibilities, rewards and sanctions that are aligned to the
vision. Each pathfinder trust was empowered to develop its own compact to meet local
objectives, needs and desired clinical outcomes (Hunter et al., 2008).
Method
Lean thinking and tools derived from the TPS were the third leg of the NETS. There is
a great deal of experience of applying Lean methods to the NHS and other parts of the
public sector but nowhere on the scale envisaged by the NETS. The VMMC pioneered
the application of the TPS to health care (Bohmer and Ferlins, 2005) and reported
significant improvements in process and performance in regard to patient safety
(Furman and Caplan, 2007). NHS North East anticipated that adopting the TPS
method would enhance patient safety; increase capacity without increasing resources
by making better use of existing resources; make full use of the potential skills and
strengths of all the members of the team; increase patient satisfaction; increase staff
satisfaction; shorten the patient pathway from first point of contact to completion
of treatment; stimulate continuous improvement as a formative process for greatest
health gain; and encourage a new culture of clinical care (Hunter et al., 2008).
At the centre of the vision, compact, method triangle was the patient, and meeting
their needs more effectively was integral to all that NETS sought to achieve. Of course,
describing the three-legged stool and its aspirations to improve the functioning
of the health system is one thing. Being confident that implementation would follow is
another entirely. So, although a vision existed and was shared, it was less certain how
widely it was supported. Also, while the compact was regarded as a critical feature of
the NETS, there was less confidence that all were agreed on what “Team North East”
was or meant or what it required to make it succeed. And, finally, when it came to the
method, although there was widespread agreement that not everyone had to sign up to
the VMPS as the chosen tool, it was also accepted that a common language and method
was needed for the full potential of the TPS to be realised. It was regarded as the DNA of
all the improvement work. But many of the senior managers in NHS organisations within
the region argued that the evidence base for the VMPS and the benefits to outcomes had
yet to be realised. In any case, some were already engaged with using some other method
and were disinclined to change course and adopt the VMPS. A majority favoured a more
flexible approach whereby a basket of tools was available upon which individual
organisations could draw as they deemed appropriate for their circumstances. In terms of
the other two legs of the stool – the vision and compact, they were broadly supportive.
Although the NETS was well underway before the introduction of the quality
innovation productivity prevention (QIPP) challenge at the time of the economic downturn
in 2009, it became a key driver for raising the profile of the NETS and injecting new
energy into it. The NETS was viewed as the region’s platform for realising QIPP with its
focus on reducing waste and variation while at the same time improving quality and
safety. But there was a view that greater convergence was required to provide the
necessary leadership and discipline. QIPP was the means by which this could be enabled
to happen in order to encourage learning and sharing across the region. A minority of
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organisations and managers did not favour convergence in any form regardless of the
motive and preferred diversity. As long as organisations were doing something, they
argued, they need not be doing the same thing when it came to Lean methods.
In the event, the proposals to refresh and re-energise the NETS never materialised
because the arrival of the coalition government in May 2010 and its move quickly to
publish plans for a major reorganisation of the NHS put paid to them (Walshe, 2010,
2012; Hunter, 2011, 2013; Klein, 2013). As soon as it became evident that NHS North
East had no future, the discussion became one of how to salvage what was already in
place concerning the NETS rather than with how to strengthen and develop it further.
In place of a focus on convergence, the emphasis was on maintaining a looser
coordination centred on a slim resource located in one of the hospital trusts which had
been an early advocate of the NETS approach involving the VMPS method.
Bringing about transformational change in health systems is regarded as particularly
challenging in the most propitious of circumstances given the complexities involved and
the multiple and diverse stakeholders to be engaged. When it is being undertaken
simultaneously with a massive structural upheaval of the kind imposed on the English
NHS by the coalition government shortly after assuming power in May 2010, which has
left little of the prevailing infrastructure intact or stable, then the difficulties and
challenges are of a different order. This is the situation that faced the NETS and it
resulted in a prolonged period of uncertainly from the time of the announcement of the
changes in July 2010 to their implementation commencing in April 2013 which also
marked the demise of the strategic health authority, NHS North East.
Evaluating the NETS
The evaluation of the NETS commenced in 2009 and ended in June 2013 (Hunter et al.,
2014). It employed the receptive contexts for change framework devised by Pettigrew
et al. (1992) for their study of strategic change in the NHS – see Figure 1. Eight
interrelated and interacting factors make up the framework: the quality and coherence
of policy; the availability of key people leading change; long-term environmental
pressure; a supportive organisational culture; effective managerial-clinical relations;
cooperative inter-organisational networks; simplicity and clarity of goals and priorities;
and the fit between a change agenda and its locale.
For the purpose of this discussion, it is the first four factors which are of critical
importance in shaping events (shaded in Figure 1). Receptive contexts for change are
dynamic not static concepts and often change over time. Indeed, this is what happened
in respect of the NETS and its development. The launch of the NETS and its early
progress were underpinned by a receptive context for change comprising all eight
factors although the four mentioned above were of particular importance. When the
external policy context changed, commencing in mid-2010 with the publication of the
coalition government’s white paper setting out its proposals for significant structural
change in the NHS, it quite quickly became one of non-receptivity (Department of
Health, 2010). This is not to suggest that elements of what the NETS stood for, or had
achieved, were no longer valid or at risk of disappearing altogether – as we will show,
in some of our study sites the NETS has survived. But it is also the case that the system
features that gave birth to the NETS and allowed it to aspire to the goals it set itself
were put under serious threat from, and ultimately dismantled by, the policy and
organisational changes announced in the white paper.
Taking the four key factors from the Pettigrew et al. (1992) framework that frame
the discussion presented in this paper in order of significance, environmental pressure
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has proved to be the most critical and potentially disruptive. In particular, there are
the resource pressures arising from the collapse of the financial sector in 2008 and the
government’s determination to tackle the deficit and usher in deep public spending
cuts. The NHS, although protected to a degree, is not wholly exempt from these and is
required to save £20 billion by 2014 with further savings to follow thereafter.
Determined to tackle the deficit through its austerity measures aimed at reducing
public spending, the government has taken the opportunity to reduce the size of the
public sector in order to encourage private alternatives (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker,
2011). Through such means it believes that health care services will become more
efficient and result in improved quality. Choice and competition are the watchwords of
the reform agenda rather than collaboration (Hudson, 2010; Reynolds et al., 2012).
Coupled with the economic downturn and an abrupt end to the additional resources
the NHS had enjoyed year-on-year between 2002 and 2008, is the changing policy
context triggered by the coalition government’s determination to simplify the NHS and
devolve responsibility for decision making to front-line GPs. In such a context, so the
theory goes, there is to be a much reduced role for the centre and therefore no need for
an intermediate tier. The changes therefore led to the demise of NHS North East
although NHS England has a subnational level comprising four regions with the
North East being subsumed within the North region. Despite the wish to simplify the
NHS structure, in reality things have not quite worked out as intended. There is both a
more complex structure in place and localism has become a largely rhetorical concept in
the face of continued top-down micro-management from government.
The second key factor is the quality and coherence of policy. The proposals for
reorganising the NHS were criticised from many quarters for their alleged incoherence
and perception that the problem for which they were deemed to be the solution was
never clearly articulated or argued (Walshe, 2010; Timmins, 2012). Indeed, the NHS had
been improving under the previous labour government and was gaining in popularity
with the public (Dixon et al., 2012). International comparisons also show it to have been
improving and punching well above its weight compared with other health systems
(Davis et al., 2007). The case for reform, especially on the scale envisaged, had,
according to its critics, simply not been made. This aroused suspicions that the real aim
was an ideological one, namely, under cover of reducing the deficit, to dismantle
the NHS as a public service and to replace it with a diverse range of services run by a
mix of private and public providers (Leys and Player, 2012). But perhaps the most
incoherent aspect of the policy was the fact it had been conceived at all since, in
opposition, the Conservative party, and Prime Minister David Cameron in particular,
had been unequivocal in stating that there would be no more top-down reform of the
NHS since structural reform on such a scale was not seen to work and was disruptive
and costly (Timmins, 2012).
The third factor refers to the key people leading change. The NETS would not have
been conceived or happened if a handful of key people in NHS North East had not had
the vision and commitment to see it happen (Erskine et al., 2013). These individuals
largely remained together over a period of years to provide continuity and consistency
of purpose. But the changes announced in 2010 soon put paid to that and those same
individuals at NHS North East were no longer co-located or in the same posts.
More than anything, their departure hastened the demise of the NETS as originally
conceived and led.
Finally, and linked to the third factor, is the existence of a supportive organisational
culture. As is evident from the work on the compact (see previous section), the NETS is
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nothing if not an attempt to change the culture of the NHS and the way staff operate
and work together. A key component is the nature of the relationship between
clinicians and managers which has always been a vexed and somewhat fractious one in
the history of the NHS. It is generally acknowledged that the NHS comprises a complex
set of cultures and trying to shape these in order to improve quality of care has been at
the heart of the NETS initiative.
Although considerable uncertainty about whether or not the proposed changes
would actually succeed in passing into legislation continued throughout most of 2011,
it became clear that the government was determined to get its way (Hunter, 2011, 2013).
In March 2012, the Health and Social Care Act was passed. At this stage in the journey
it was inevitable that the original purpose of the NETS would need to be revisited.
NETS meets “big bang” change
The NHS in England (the NHS in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland has proved to
be more stable and resilient) has been restructured regularly since 1974 with successive
waves of change following each other with increasing rapidity. It should therefore come
as no surprise that a new incoming government elected in May 2010 would quickly
overturn its alleged distaste for massive “big bang” upheaval and impose possibly the
biggest bang ever to affect the NHS (Hunter, 2011). Whatever the merits and/or
demerits of the changes, and these continue to be hotly debated, it is fair to say that
they took those working in the NHS completely by surprise. No one was expecting, or
had been prepared for, what appeared in two white papers published in July (this one
dealt with the NHS changes) and December (this one focused on the public health
changes) 2010, respectively.
In terms of the impact of the changes on the NETS, these were quite profound
insofar as they resulted in the loss of the region-wide body, NHS North East which had
nurtured and nudged and generally overseen the entire initiative from its inception up
until the time when the health authority’s abolition was signalled. There then followed
the departure or relocation of key NHS managers many of whom were redeployed
to other posts elsewhere, often some distance away. The resulting loss of leadership
and corporate memory meant that the original idea for a coalition of the willing gave
way to a more modest entity hosted by a hospital trust that was itself one of the early
pioneers of the NETS.
When major change is embarked upon in the NHS, the claims and counter-claims
invariably result in the service being trapped between two irreconcilable tensions.
On the one hand, it is often asserted that for the NHS to change, “disruptive innovation”
is called for. It may be painful and may result in losses but overall, it is claimed, the
gains far outweigh these. On the other hand, it is claimed that the NHS is too eager to
change the organisational structure while leaving many of the issues to which such
change is ostensibly addressed virtually untouched. This is because structural change
can leave culture intact and if it is culture that is the target of change then a quite
different approach is required. The architects of the NETS were acutely aware of this
distinction and did not regard structural change in itself as having any relevance to
what was required, namely, a wholesale rethink of the way the work was done. In short,
changing the culture was the goal and for this to succeed, it was acknowledged that it
would entail embarking on a long journey without an end in sight. It was also accepted
that it would take several years to enable the changes to take effect and become
embedded. Although large-scale transformational change is indeed viewed as a
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never-ending journey, such a way of thinking did not sit easily in a public service like
the NHS which demanded quick, visible and tangible results and which itself was
undergoing almost continuous structural change. And so it proved. The NETS is not an
island and it was unable to survive as originally designed, when subject to a politically
led change initiative driven by central government.
Paradoxically, the NETS became a victim of the very change strategy it was seeking
to supplant with a quite different approach based on changing the culture. This
involved creating the momentum for change from the bottom up rather than being
imposed from the top as had happened too often in the NHS hitherto. Even so, for some
organisations and leaders locally, the centre was not central government in London but
the health authority, NHS North East, located in Newcastle. Having the health authority
drive and lead the NETS had many supporters but also some detractors who wanted
to pursue a more diverse, locally led approach in which they had the freedom to do
what they felt was right for their organisations and communities.
For the NETS to succeed on its own terms, the NHS was required to freeze in order
to allow changes in culture and behaviour to take root. But with the NHS unexpectedly
subjected to a major reconfiguration of its structures and systems, this virtually put
paid to the ambition and original conception of the NETS as a region-wide venture that
would provide a new and different way of realising deep change across an entire health
community. Moreover, whereas the NETS ethos is one of encouraging cooperation and
working together, the government’s changes are about marketisation and putting
services out to tender to allow private sector providers to compete alongside public
sector ones. But as markets and competition are about fragmentation as organisations
compete for resources (Currie et al., 2008), such behaviour goes against what the
NETS is seeking to achieve.
As the changes and the enormity of their implications became clear, different sites
in our study adopted different stratagems either as coping mechanisms or because they
had no alternative. In a community services trust work ceased altogether because
of a merger with an acute hospital trust which sought to impose its approach to
transformational change. This did not involve signing up to the full NETS package in
terms of the VMPS and being a member of the coalition, although broadly similar aims
were pursued. In some other sites work on the NETS either stalled or slowed down
through insufficient resources or their diversion to other priorities. Finally, in two or
three of our study sites, not all of them NETS champions, work proceeded more or less
as planned in order to embed change and retain a focus on improving services.
The quotes which follow from the semi-structured interviews conducted for the
study illustrate some of these issues. Our initial wave of interviews were conducted
prior to the implementation of the 2010 reforms, although with the financial squeeze
on public services, including the NHS, already beginning there was a recognition
that money was going to get tight. The second wave of interviews took place when the
coalition government’s changes were beginning to take shape and impact on the work
and consciousness of those leading the NETS in the region.
The importance of commitment and consistency of purpose at a time of major
change is well articulated in the following excerpt:
[T]he most important thing is to have that organisational commitment and the leadership and
the consistency of purpose really to just keep going at it and be prepared for it to take time. It’s
quite difficult in circumstances where, you know, people are coming along and saying you
have to reduce your budget by 25% over the next four years or something.
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When asked specifically about the impact of the impending restructuring, this same
interviewee went on:
I do have anxieties about how the approach will survive and/or thrive in the region because
the [Strategic Health Authority] has played an important part in keeping this together and
keeping it going. I think inevitably that will fall away a bit without the SHA. Because even
though many of the organisers are currently saying we need to keep this going, I think once it
comes to a situation where there are individual pressures on each, different priorities will mean
that people don’t have quite as much to put into it (Medical Director, Mental Health Trust).
But the need to ensure survival was not always successful as the following excerpt
shows:
We’re going through incredible change. We were striving to become a community foundation
trust […] and hoping to be one of the first in the country. Now we’re unable to do that for
reasons completely outside of our control, so it’s another change. We were planning
on becoming an organisation in our own right where we would be in complete control and in
charge of what we were striving to achieve. A huge risk to that is whichever organisation we
end up being part of, what’s their view on Lean and our philosophy and way of working?
(Quality Improvement Lead, Former Community Services Trust).
Those wedded to the NETS approach as derived from VMMC’s with the VMPS
were convinced it was the right approach and should be maintained. The following
excerpt gives a sense of this dedication and belief in what the chief executive had been
exposed to:
I found the visit to Virginia Mason absolutely inspirational […] What it did was it showed
me what a hospital can become with the consistent application of this methodology and
entwining it with their leadership and management development strategy and their OD
strategy. So it’s like a rope. Each of the threads is strong but actually when you interweave it,
it becomes even stronger (CEO, Mental Health Trust).
But as has already been mentioned, change of this nature takes time and embedding
it cannot be rushed if it is to prove sustainable. The point is eloquently expressed in
this excerpt:
I think it’s slow embedding. It’s not been wham bam we are now displaying these behaviours.
It’s a slow embedding of the process. [It’s] the same with the quality system. [A] lot of staff
have been through improvement activity […] [and] they become quite passionate converts.
[I]t’s about displaying the behaviours but is a sustained journey. Initially the Trust committed
to 10 years. I don’t think we could do it rapidly. It’s not something you embed as an
organisation in rapid or a fixed time (KPO Lead, Mental Health Trust).
As mentioned earlier, the choice of Lean method was an issue for the field sites not all of
which wished to adopt the VMPS. The following excerpts reveal the different views with the
first subscribing to a loose-tight approach while the second adheres to a purist approach:
We were signed up to NETS […] and whilst we have got a commitment to do Lean
management techniques and make savings and efficiencies wherever we can, we just weren’t
using the VMPS (Director of Corporate Development, Acute Hospitals Trust).
I know we will keep pure to the model [VMPS] and I want to keep pure to the model because
there must be a reason why Toyota despite their blip has been the most successful car
company in the world […] and the totality of the approach isn’t applying Lean techniques in
an ad hoc way, it’s the way it’s linked with their people management approach (CEO, Mental
Health Trust).
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And finally the excerpt below demonstrates a determination to keep to the plan set out
prior to the NHS changes:
[NETS] is sustainable in our trust […] we did initially commit to a 10 year journey. Despite the
NHS reforms that direction of travel hasn’t changed (KPO Lead, Mental Health Trust).
In the Table I we link the above interview excerpts to each of the four key factors from
the Pettigrew et al. framework (see Figure 1). As is clear, these particular issues
and concerns were raised and reinforced repeatedly by our interviewees, including
others not cited here.
Whether any of the organisations which adopted the NETS approach can sustain
their commitment to it matters in terms of their own investment in transformational
change. But of course, the NETS was about much more than simply its adoption by
individual NHS organisations. Its original purpose was about whole system change
across an entire region and in that respect the NETS has been unable to prove itself.
Further, given the nature of the changes taking effect within the NHS it seems unlikely
that an opportunity to test fully such an approach will ever again present itself.
However, although the story of the NETS may not have an unequivocally happy
ending, it does provide important lessons for ensuring that complex change initiatives
do not easily get abandoned or derailed when structures change and/or disappear and
people, who perform as “product champions”, move on.
Lessons to be drawn from the NETS story
There are four important lessons to emerge from the experience of the NETS. These
may apply equally to any major system-wide transformation initiative that is
confronted by major structural change of a type which alters the entire landscape and
context in which the project has been conceived and prosecuted.
First, given that at least three, and possibly four, of our 14 sites remained committed
to the NETS programme while other sites adopted some of its features but had not
bought into the whole package, in particular the VMPS method, it may be that
the precise choice of method is less important than to what purpose it is put and the fact
that there exists genuine commitment to improvement. This refers to the loose-tight
tension noted earlier whereby being permissive about means may be perfectly
legitimate as long as the purposes and goals are tight in terms of their clarity and
measurability in order to demonstrate improvement.
Second, allowing a degree of flexibility over means while being tight about ends
may be optimal when the whole system is undergoing major change, and embedding
that change, as we have seen, takes time. Those sites that decided to remain outside
the NETS “club” of early pathfinders and subsequent joiners may have insulated
themselves from the loss of momentum that followed the announcement of the 2010
Pettigrew et al. context Interviewee
Environmental pressure Medical Director, Mental Health Trust; Quality Improvement Lead,
Former Community Services Trust
Quality and coherence of policy KPO Lead, Mental Health Trust; CEO Mental Health Trust
Key people leading change Medical Director, Mental Health Trust; CEO, Mental Health Trust
Supportive organisational
culture
Medical Director, Mental Health Trust; Quality Improvement Lead,
Former Community Services Trust; KPO Lead, Mental Health Trust
Table I.
Four key factors
from Pettigrew et al.
framework
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NHS changes. After all, they were not dependent on the NETS “family” having retained
their independence to decide on what particular mix of improvement methods worked
best for them. However, at least two of the study sites which were strong advocates
of the NETS project were also able to maintain momentum largely because they had
been among the earliest adopters of the three-legged stool and had begun to embed its
principles and ethos throughout the organisation. It was this steadfast approach,
combined with committed leadership, which provided continuity.
Third, at a time of significant upheaval affecting virtually the whole health system,
a top-down led approach to change which in effect the NETS was in many respects
carries particular risks if it cannot be maintained and if key elements and individuals
are removed and/or relocated. In such a context, and to minimise any risk of a change
initiative collapsing entirely or of being overly reliant on an heroic individual, engaging
individuals at all levels in the change effort by adopting a distributed or shared model
of leadership may optimise the chances of the change initiative being maintained
especially in complex settings (Bennett et al., 2003; Western, 2008). Shared/distributed
leadership is perhaps most effective where the tasks are interdependent, complex
and require creativity (Hartley and Benington, 2010). Fulop and Mark (2013) refer to
the importance of “relational leadership as a process of social engagement and
co-construction” and a means of coping with the seeming irrationality and messiness
of major changes and reorganisations that are driven for political reasons. These facets
of complex systems are all features of the NETS where situations arise that require
what Heifetz (1994) calls adaptive leadership. The issues and challenges confronting
the NETS require front-line staff to come together to find solutions to problems
directly affecting them in order to do their work more effectively. Possibly the ideal
combination for an initiative like NETS is the existence of both individual leadership
and shared leadership. The former style is needed to get the organisation aligned with
the NETS vision, compact and method but the latter style is essential to ensure that
these elements are embedded and sustained.
Finally, and linked to the last learning point, it is vital that change is embedded in the
actual work and is located with those charged with doing it (Seddon, 2008). It cannot
occur somewhere else and then be imposed on the work situation. The analogy here is
with NHS North East which was the key driver for the NETS and which provided
strategic leadership for the entire process. However, once it became clear that the health
authority was not going to survive it resulted in the whole NETS approach becoming less
region-wide and more focused on a few enthusiasts and their respective organisations.
Therefore, while it may be possible to sustain some elements of transformational
change when a whole system is undergoing significant turbulence, it is unlikely that
the region-wide ambition of what the NETS sought to do can be protected and assured.
Conclusions
From this review of lessons, a number of critical factors stand out in respect of
maintaining a commitment to the NETS or, indeed, to any other similar large-scale
transformational change process. None of these is especially novel or unexpected but it
is their combination that is especially important since no single factor operating in
isolation will be sufficient to maintain progress. We employed the Pettigrew et al.
receptive contexts for change framework to guide both data collection and analysis.
In the context of this paper and its focus on the impact of the 2013 NHS changes on the
NETS programme, four components of the receptive contexts for change framework
were especially significant in accounting for what happened. While a supportive
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organisational culture and key people leading change proved to be pre-requisites
for effective change, neither were likely to occur or prove sustainable if the other
two factors – environmental pressure and quality and coherence of policy – were not
aligned and pulling in different directions. If the general environment is unstable and
policy is subjected to frequent shifts of direction for primarily political or ideological
reasons, and uninformed by robust evidence, then preserving and sustaining
successful change initiatives becomes especially challenging and unpredictable.
Implementing transformational change is always a complex and difficult business
(Best et al., 2012). It has been estimated that the success of any major transformational
change initiative is likely to result largely from a mix of politics and context. Ovretveit
(2012) has issued what he terms a “transferability warning” whereby transformational
change is more likely to be implemented where the following conditions apply: there
is strong evidence (accounting for 20 per cent of success); there is implementation
competence (30 per cent); and the context, including financial and regulatory issues
(50 per cent), remains favourable. If these three elements are aligned then the precise
change intervention is far more likely to succeed. But, as he acknowledges, achieving
such alignment is rare and more likely the ultimate fate of a particular change will be at
the mercy of political pressures and contextual factors over which there is probably
no control or even influence.
Paradoxically, the harder aspects of method, including the choice of Lean tools, are
easier to implement. Much more difficult, and often beyond the influence or control of
local stakeholders, are the political and cultural factors that shape and determine
so much of what happens, or does not happen, in complex health systems. Perhaps
the most significant lesson from the NETS is that achieving whole system change is
particularly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of politics especially where that system,
like the UK NHS, is itself subject to those very same pressures. All of which bears out
Navarro’s observation that despite having an enormous influence on health policy, the
political context is frequently avoided in academic research (Navarro, 2011). Yet, it was
a Prussian pathologist turned anthropologist turned parliamentarian, Rudolf Virchow
(1821-1902), who famously wrote: “Medicine is a social science, and politics nothing else
but medicine on a large scale”. The play of politics at a national level sealed the fate
of the NETS and has largely determined what it has evolved into rather than what it
might have become (Virchow, R. Quoted in Miller, 1973).
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